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Abstract
In this article, I seek to develop the argument that the law of  outer space, as it was to be de-
veloped during the 1960s and 1970s, configured outer space as a ‘commons’ in order to 
displace two prevailing ‘dystopic’ socio-technical imaginaries that were to be associated with 
the Cold War. One of  these was that outer space might become a place of  warfare – and, more 
specifically, a warfare of  annihilatory proportions between the two main protagonists of  the 
Cold War; the other, that it might be the object of  ‘primitive accumulation’. Drawing upon the 
work of  Herbert Marcuse, I argue that, whilst the nascent code of  outer space visibly sought 
to repress both of  these possibilities, it did so by bringing into play a particular ‘technological 
rationality’, in which each of  these aversions were to reappear as sustaining configurations – 
as what might be called the rational irrationalities of  a Cold War commons.
1 Introduction
It is a strange feature of  the contemporary world that so many of  its operative con-
figurations appear increasingly to be organized through the medium of  a technology 
that is, almost by definition, ‘unearthly’.1 Satellites have revolutionized life on the 
planet – from global communications, to navigation, to meteorology, cartography, 
applyparastyle "fig//caption/p[1]" parastyle "FigCapt"
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1 S. Graham, Vertical: The City from Satellites to Bunkers (2016), at 26.
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surveillance and, ultimately, warfare.2 Their effects are felt everywhere – configuring 
travel and trade, production and consumption, leisure and work, the accumulation of  
knowledge and its dissemination – yet their ghostly presence at the outer edges of  the 
atmosphere positions them outside our experience of  everyday life. Even more pertin-
ently, despite their centrality to the everyday life of  political, social or cultural affairs, 
their management and control rarely enters the conscious circuits of  public debate or 
scrutiny.3
If  we may be relatively unconscious as to the everyday significance of  the extra-
terrestrial organization of  social life through the medium of  the satellite, we may be 
far more conscious of  the spectacular backstory – of  the Cold War space race, of  the 
launch of  Sputnik in 1957, of  Uri Gagarin and of  Apollo 11. We might equally be 
aware of  the myriad of  contemporary projects that have revitalized interest in outer 
space in recent years – from the space tourism programme of  Virgin Galactic, to pro-
jects directed towards the mining of  asteroids (Planetary Resources and Deep Space 
Industries), and the ever more ambitious, and far reaching, programmes of  inter-
planetary colonization envisaged by companies such as SpaceX.
Of  the enabling resources for all such activities, the technological and the imagina-
tive are characteristically at the forefront, evidenced in one direction by developments 
in rocketry and robotics, in miniaturization and 3D printing and, in the other, by the 
ongoing production of  books and movies in the ever popular genre of  science fiction. 
Of  relevance also, however, has been the facilitative environment of  law: first, in the 
construction of  a regime for outer space that configured it as a ‘commons’ – as the 
‘province of  humankind’ or its ‘common heritage’ – open to peaceful exploration and 
use on the part of  all and in the interests of  all, and, second, in the enactment of  
 enabling legislation in various states – including the USA and Luxembourg – which 
have sought to encourage the commercial space resource industry and sanction, in 
the process, the private appropriation of  outer space resources.4
In the course of  this article, I want to develop the argument that the code for outer 
space, as it was to be developed during the 1960s and 1970s, configured outer space 
as a ‘commons’ in order to displace two prevailing ‘dystopic’ socio-technical imagin-
aries.5 One of  these was that outer space might become a place of  warfare – and, more 
specifically, a warfare of  annihilatory proportions between the two protagonists in the 
Cold War; the other, that it might be the object of  ‘colonization’, ‘appropriation’, and/
or ‘primitive accumulation’. I argue that whilst the code itself  visibly sought to repress 
both of  these possibilities, it did so by bringing into play a particular ‘technological 
rationality’ in which each of  these aversions were to reappear as sustaining configur-
ations – as the rational irrationalities of  a Cold War commons.
2 D. Millard, Satellite: Innovation in Orbit (2017).
3 Graham, supra note 1, at 27.
4 See, e.g., US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (2015) HR 2262; Loi du 20 juillet 2017 sur 
l’exploration et l’utilisation des resources de l’espace, Journal Officiel no. 674 (28 July 2017).
5 On the productive role of  socio-technological imaginaries, see S.  Jasanoff  and S.-H. Kim, Dreamscapes 
of  Modernity (2015), at 4, in which they describe such imaginaries as ‘collectively held, institutionally 
stabilized, and publicly performed visions of  desirable futures’.
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2 Outer Space and the Socio-Technical Imaginary
Prior to the time in which H.G. Wells was to popularize the term at the end of  the 19th 
century, ‘outer space’ was not so much ‘outer’ space (connoted by a clean demarca-
tion between the atmosphere and that which lay beyond) as a frontier of  knowledge 
and experience, which delineated the earth from the heavens, the known from the un-
known, the proximate from the remote and the real from the apparent.6 What was to 
encourage or enable outer space to gain its prospective specificity were developments 
in the science and technology of  flight. Key advances in the understanding of  fluid 
dynamics, wing design and technologies of  propulsion provided the conditions of  pos-
sibility that enabled a practical demarcation between a space that might be moved 
through or within (a socialized space of  kinds) and that which existed only as a site 
of  speculative or imaginative endeavour. ‘Air space’ was thus to be the preserve of  the 
balloonists and early flight pioneers; ‘outer space’ that of  the nascent amateur astro-
nautic societies7 and authors of  the emergent genre of  science fiction (Jules Verne,8 
H.G. Wells,9 Kurd Laßwitz10 and Konstantin Tsiolkovsky11). If, for the latter, it was the 
anticipated feats of  scientific and technological ingenuity that provided the ground-
work for their fictive accounts of  journeys to the moon or encounters with other 
 species (in space ships shot out of  guns or spheres coated with anti-gravity material); 
for the former, it was the inspiration provided by those fictional accounts that both en-
couraged and directed their scientific and technical energies, shaping their imagina-
tive objectives and refining the operative modalities.
Whilst the central obsession of  science fiction authors and rocket enthusiasts alike 
was the supersession of  the boundaries of  earthly knowledge and experience – and the 
development of  a set of  technologies by means of  which they might be traversed – the 
obsession of  governmental advisors and lawyers was its opposite: how to secure state 
authority by delineating and categorizing the space that technology had threatened 
to open up. Whereas science fiction looked beyond the space of  sovereignty, or sought 
to efface or provincialize it in the cosmic imagination, the architects of  sovereignty 
sought to render mundane all such imaginings. For it was not just the ability to fly 
that was at stake, or, indeed, the commercial opportunities that aeronautics seemed to 
open out, but, rather, the security of  the state that had become ever more vulnerable 
as a consequence of  the opportunities for surveillance, espionage and new forms of  
warfare that flight enabled.12
6 See, e.g., A. von Humboldt, Cosmos (1865) I, at 66.
7 E.g., the Verein für Raumschiffahrt (VfR), the British Interplanetary Society and the American 
Interplanetary (Rocket) Society, the Gruppa izucheniya reaktivnogo dvizheniya and the Wissenschaftliche 
Gesellschaft für Höhenforschung. The work of  these societies was heavily influenced by the work of  
Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Robert Goddard, Hermann Oberth, Herman Potocnik and Robert Esnault-Pelterie.
8 E.g., J. Verne, From the Earth to the Moon (1865).
9 E.g., H.G. Wells, The War of  the Worlds (1897).
10 K. Laßwitz, Two Planets (1897).
11 K. Tsiolkovsky, Dreams of  Earth and Sky and the Effects of  Gravitation (1896).
12 See M. Neocleous, War Power, Police Power (2014); T. Hippler, Governing from the Skies (2017).
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In the early years of  the 20th century, then, jurists turned their attention to defining, 
as Harold Hazeltine put it, ‘the rights of  states in the column of  air superincumbent upon 
the earth’s surface of  land and sea’,13 and their main concern was to strike a balance be-
tween the prospective commercial opportunities of  air flight and the  security interests 
that were likely to be engaged by unrestricted overflight. In the ensuing dialogue the old 
mare liberum/mare clausum debate was re-enacted in relation to airspace (the ‘second 
battle of  the books’, as it was called14), with jurists lining up on either side. Some, like 
Paul Pradier Fodéré and Ernest Nys, argued that airspace was incapable of  being subject 
to sovereign control; others, like Joachim von Holtzendorf  and Paul Fauchille, argued 
that sovereignty extended into airspace, at least as far as the technology of  policing al-
lowed.15 Of  the various ‘juridical societies’ that were to turn their attention to the issue 
in the years before 1914 (the Institut de Droit International, the Congresso giuridico 
internazionale per il regolamento della locamozione aerea, the Comité juridique inter-
national de l’aviation and the International Law Association), the ‘solution’ was typic-
ally either to declare the skies to be ‘free’, subject to a right of  regulation in the name of  
security,16 or to declare them to be an intrinsic space of  sovereignty subject to a right 
of  civilian overflight or ‘innocent passage’.17 The terms of  the 1919 Paris Convention 
on Aerial Navigation – followed in 1944 by the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation – 
broadly opted for the latter, proclaiming that every state had ‘complete and exclusive 
sovereignty over the air space above its territory’ whilst providing for a right of  overflight 
subject, in both cases, to limitation ‘for reasons of  military necessity or public safety’.18 
There was no right of  overflight for military/’state’ aircraft19 nor for unmanned air-
craft,20 and contracting parties were entitled to prohibit or regulate both the overflight 
of  certain areas and the use of  photographic equipment.21
Whilst the new field of  air law provided grounds for states to lay claim to the air-
space above their territory, what it did not take account of  was the development 
of  rocket technology in the interwar years and the popularizing zeal of  the early 
‘Astrofuturists’,22 such as David Lasser,23 Willy Ley24 and Wernher von Braun. By the 
13 H. Hazeltine, The Law of  the Air (1911), at 6.
14 English, ‘Air Freedom: The Second Battle of  the Books’, 2 Journal of  Air Law (1931) 356.
15 See generally Sand et al., ‘An Historical Survey of  International Air Law before the Second World War’, 7 
McGill Law Journal (1960–1961) 24; Hazeltine, supra note 13, at 9–29.
16 Fauchille’s solution. ‘Régime Juridique des Aérostats’, 19 Annuaire de Institut de droit international (AIDI) 
(1902) 19, at 32.
17 Westlake’s solution. ‘Régime des Aérostats et de la Télégraphie sans fil’, 21 AIDI (1906) 293, at 297.
18 Convention Relating to the Regulation of  Aerial Navigation (Paris Convention) 1919, 11 LNTS 173, Art. 
1; Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) 1944, 15 UNTS 295.
19 Paris Convention, supra note 18, Arts 30–32; Chicago Convention, supra note 18, Art. 3.
20 Chicago Convention, supra note 18, Art. 8.
21 Paris Convention, supra note 18, Art. 27; Chicago Convention, supra note 18, Art. 36.
22 D. Kilgore, Astrofuturism: Science, Race and Visions of  Utopia in Space (2002). As he describes it, astro-
futurism was a ‘tradition of  speculative fiction and science writing inaugurated by scientists and science 
popularizers’ which drew upon the rich history of  science fiction but was ‘distinguished by its close con-
nections to engineering projects funded by the government and military’ (at 2).
23 See, e.g., D. Lasser, The Conquest of  Space (1931).
24 W. Ley, Rockets, Missiles and Space Travel (1951 [1944]). Ley was founder of  the VfR.
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end of  World War II, and largely as a consequence of  the German adaptation of  that 
technology in the development of  the V2 rockets, it became evident not only that it 
would be technically possible to launch a projectile into the extra-atmospheric void 
(outer space), but also that such a possibility would open up an entirely new set of  
legal problems that the rules of  air law were barely capable of  answering.
In a highly influential series of  articles initially published in Colliers magazine 
in 1951,25 Wernher von Braun (the former head of  the V2 Rocket programme 
in Germany, later to become director of  the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration [NASA]), together with a pre-eminent group of  US scientists, drew 
 attention to the technological and scientific possibilities of  establishing an orbital 
space station as a platform for the ‘conquest of  space’. In a companion contribution 
entitled ‘Who Owns the Universe?’, Oscar Schachter set out what he saw to be the 
new challenges. The problem, as he saw it, was twofold. First, and drawing upon the 
history of  colonial expansion, he speculated that the pathologies of  territorial rivalry 
might well be  extended to ‘the heavens themselves’, leading to the planting of  flags 
and claims of  sovereignty over the moon and other celestial bodies: ‘We might then 
be reading of  lunar “Washingtons” and “New Yorks”, perhaps of  King George moun-
tains and Stalin craters’.26 In the second place, he suggested that there was a need for 
rules governing ‘rocket ships and space stations’; ‘will they be free to move about’, he 
asked, ‘laden with weapons of  mass destruction, high above peaceful nations?’27
The answer to the first of  these problems, as Schachter saw it, was to eliminate 
the problem of  sovereignty by extending to outer space the same principles that ap-
plied with respect to the high seas – to render it ‘the common heritage of  humanity’,28 
 allowing ‘free and equal use rather than exclusive possession’.29 This would, in his 
view, stave off  claims of  sovereignty, but would not, at the same time, entirely preclude 
the possibility of  claiming ownership over resources were they to be extracted. In this 
respect, he drew upon the analogy of  the rules relating to ‘sedentary fisheries’ on the 
high seas (pearl, oyster and sponge beds and coral deposits). In that context, however, 
there would have to be a requirement that all spacecraft have a nationality and a flag 
so as to enable the extraterrestrial (as opposed to merely extraterritorial) application 
of  national laws regulating activities on board (including radio or television broad-
casting). Spacecraft seeking to evade that rule, he added, would be subject, like pirates 
of  old, to seizure by any government able to lay hands on it.30
A much more difficult problem, he admitted, concerned the possibility of  space-
craft being equipped with ‘bombs of  mass destruction’.31 He doubted the possibility of  
25 Subsequently published as C. Ryan (ed.), Across the Space Frontier (1952) with contributions from Joseph 
Kaplan, Wernher von Braun, Heinz Haber, Willy Ley, Fred Whipple, Oscar Schachter and Sir Harold 
Spencer Jones.
26 O. Schachter, ‘Who Owns the Universe?’, in C. Ryan (ed.), Across the Space Frontier (1952) 118, at 121.
27 Ibid., at 118.
28 Ibid., at 131.
29 Ibid., at 121–122.
30 Ibid., at 125.
31 Ibid., at 126.
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outlawing completely the use of  outer space for military purposes, but he did suggest 
that satellite space ships might be used as an ‘implement of  peace and security rather 
than of  war’. Recalling the Baruch plan of  1946, he suggested that it ‘might not be 
far-fetched’ to envisage the use of  satellite photo reconnaissance for purposes of  regu-
lating armaments and atomic energy as part of  an international control system.32 
But, of  course, that would require an international treaty, and it was unlikely that 
governments ‘will undertake to negotiate such a treaty, or even to consider the issue, 
until circumstances have made it an actual problem’.33
The final problem to which Schachter drew attention was that of  ‘delimiting’ outer 
space or, to put it in other terms, of  determining the vertical extent of  territorial sov-
ereignty.34 Here, he noted that the old Roman law notion that property, and, hence, 
sovereignty, extended upwards ‘usque ad coelum’ encountered very real limits when 
applied to a satellite in orbit ‘moving 1,075 miles above the rotating earth at 15,840 
miles per hour’.35 And he proposed, instead, that the limit should be fixed at the upper 
boundary of  the airspace (wherever that lay) beyond which no nation would be per-
mitted to exercise dominion.
3 The Code for Space
Schachter’s account of  the legal questions that he saw to be on the horizon in the de-
velopment of  space technology was remarkably prescient, anticipating by over a decade 
many of  the key features of  the new code for outer space that was developed in the after-
math of  the launch of  Sputnik I on 4 October 1957. If  the Sputnik launch inaugurated 
a space race between the two principal Cold War powers that was to endure at least until 
the Apollo 11 moon landing in 1969, it also mobilized a series of  legal and institutional 
initiatives beginning with the formation, in the following a year, of  what became the 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of  Outer Space (COPUOS).36 Over the next two decades, 
in addition to the establishment of  both national and international space agencies,37 
five treaties were concluded (the Outer Space Treaty [1967],38 the Rescue Agreement 
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., at 127.
34 Ibid., at 128.
35 Ibid., at 129.
36 GA Res. 1348 (XIII), 13 December 1958. It was initially established as an ad hoc committee, but was later 
made permanent. Report of  Ad Hoc COPUOS, UN Doc. A/4141, 14 July 1959.
37 Current international agencies include: International Telecommunication Union (1865, 1992); Interna- 
tional Telecommunications Satellite Organization (1971); Intersputnik Organization of  Space 
Communications (1971); European Space Agency (1975); Arab Satellite Communications Organization 
(1976); Council on International Cooperation in the Study and Utilization of  Outer Space (1976); 
International Mobile Satellite Organization (1976); European Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
(1982); European Organization for the Exploitation of  Meterological Satellites (1983).
38 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of  States in the Exploration and Use of  Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 1967, 610 UNTS 205; see generally Vlasic, ‘The Space 
Treaty: A Preliminary Evaluation’, 55 California Law Review (1967) 507; Lachs, ‘The International Law 
of  Outer Space’, 113 Hague Recueil (1964) 1; J.  Fawcett, International Law and the Uses of  Outer Space 
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[1968],39 the Liability Convention [1972],40 the Registration Convention [1978]41 
and the Moon Treaty [1979]),42 and a slew of  United Nations (UN) General Assembly 
resolutions adopted (including, in particular, the 1963 Declaration of  Legal Principles 
Governing Activities of  States in the Exploration and Use of  Outer Space [Declaration 
on Outer Space]).43 A new field of  legal study and expertise came into being, its tent-
acles spreading, alongside the technology that accompanied it, into the fields of  telecom-
munications, surveillance, meteorology, navigation, arms control and cartography.
One of  the initial tasks assigned to COPUOS in 1958 was to ‘study the nature of  
the legal problems which may arise from the exploration of  outer space’,44 and it 
was immediately apparent that two issues were at the forefront: first, the question 
of   ownership or sovereignty in outer space and, second, the problem of  its potential 
 militarization.45 These, of  course, were not unconnected; it being perfectly obvious to 
all concerned that the legitimate use of  outer space for military purposes depended 
in the first instance upon the resolution of  the issue of  sovereignty. And the problem 
encountered was that both the Paris Convention of  1919 and the Chicago Convention 
of  1944 had, in almost identical terms, set out the principle that every state enjoyed 
‘complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory’.46 Whilst the 
(1968); G. Zhukov and Y. Kolosov, International Space Law (1984); B. Cheng, Studies in International Space 
Law (1997); F. Lyall and P. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009); M. Lachs, The Law of  Outer Space: An 
Experience in Contemporary Law-Making, edited by T. Masson-Zwaan and S. Hobe (2010).
39 Agreement on the Rescue of  Astronauts, the Return of  Astronauts and the Return of  Objects Launched 
into Outer Space 1968, 672 UNTS 119.
40 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 1972, 961 UNTS 187.
41 Convention on Registration of  Objects Launched into Outer Space 1975, 1023 UNTS 15.
42 Agreement Governing the Activities of  States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty) 
1979, 1363 UNTS 3. Various other multilateral space-related treaties include: Treaty Banning Nuclear 
Weapons in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water 1963, 480 UNTS 43; Convention Relating 
to the Distribution of  Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite 1974, 1144 UNTS 3; 
International Space Station Agreement 1998, KAV 5899.
43 GA Res. 1962 (XVIII), 13 December 1963. Since the 1980s, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly 
has adopted three sets of  principles relating to the use of  satellites for direct television broadcasting 
(GA Res. 37/92, 10 December 1982); remote sensing (GA Res. 41/65, 3 December 1986)  and the 
use of  nuclear power in outer space (GA Res. 47/68, 14 December 1992). It also adopted, in 1996, a 
Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of  Outer Space, GA Res. 51/122, 
13 December 1996 and a Resolution on the Prevention of  an Arms Race in Outer Space, GA Res. 62/20, 
5 December 2007.
44 GA Res. 1348 (XIII), 13 December 1958.
45 See, e.g., Ryan, ‘Introduction’, in J. Kaplan et al., Across the Space Frontier (1952) xi, at xiii: ‘[A] ruthless 
power established on a space station could actually subjugate the peoples of  the world. Sweeping around 
the earth in a fixed orbit like a second moon, this man-made island in the heavens could be used as a plat-
form from which to launch guided missiles. Radar-controlled projectiles armed with atomic war heads 
could be fired at any target on the earth’s surface with devastating accuracy, and because of  their enor-
mous speeds and relatively small size, it would be almost impossible to intercept such missiles.’
46 Chicago Convention, supra note 18, Art. 8 also prohibited overflight by pilotless aircraft, which led to 
some discussion as to what constituted an aircraft for such purposes. Annex 7 to the Chicago Convention 
dealing with aircraft nationality defined an aircraft as ‘any machine that can derive support in the atmos-
phere from the reactions of  the air’, which presumably excluded extra-atmospheric craft. See generally 
Cooper, ‘Legal Problems of  Upper Space’, 23 Air Law and Commerce (1956) 308.
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launch of  Sputnik appeared to demonstrate a general acquiescence in the overflight of  
‘peaceful’ satellites,47 a vigorous debate nevertheless broke out concerning the ques-
tion as to where sovereignty over airspace might end and how it might be delimited. 
The solutions varied – some configured around the terms of  the Chicago Convention, 
others based upon technical capabilities of  aircraft or the scientific characteristics of  
the atmosphere (the Karman Line) or by the nature and type of  activity – yet the gen-
eral starting point was a common one – namely, that the ‘cone theory’ associated with 
the projection outwards of  territorial sovereignty usque ad coelum made little sense. On 
that score, Wilfred Jenks had offered an early critique, widely picked up, in which he 
pointed out that:
missiles, space stations and space ships moving in space would be constantly changing their 
position in relation to the subjacent territorial sovereignties at such high speeds that whatever 
relationship of  control might subsist between earth stations and such objects in space would 
have no territorial aspect analogous to the control exerted by a state in its air space or territorial 
waters.48
As a consequence, Jenks supposed, space beyond the atmosphere of  the earth must 
always be ‘a res extra commercium incapable of  appropriation by the projection into 
such space of  any particular sovereignty based on a fraction of  the earth’s surface’.49 
Georgy Zadorozhnyi’s later argument in defence of  the Sputnik programme to the 
 effect that such satellites did ‘not violate the air sovereignty of  any state’ because it 
was not the case that Sputnik was moving but, rather, that the earth was moving 
underneath it,50 however self-serving, only seemed to confirm the same thesis. Some 
line had to be drawn between (terrestrial) territorial sovereignty and outer space, al-
beit the precise point of  demarcation was almost entirely elusive.51
However, once it was decided that sovereignty had to stop somewhere, the ancil-
lary question as to what was to exist on the other side opened out. Did principles of  
international law reach out beyond the atmosphere?52 What were the appropriate 
analogies? And then, of  course, there was the question of  the status of  outer space 
and the celestial bodies; were they, or their resources, open to acquisition? Or did they 
47 W. Burrows, This New Ocean (1999), at 191. See, e.g., G. Feldman, ‘An American View of  Jurisdiction in 
Outer Space’, 1 Proceedings on the Law of  Outer Space (PLOS) (1958) 45, at 47.
48 Jenks, ‘International Law and Activities in Space’, 5 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1956) 
99, at 103.
49 Ibid.
50 G. Zadorzhnyi, ‘The Artificial Satellite and International Law’, Sovetskaia Rossiia (17 October 1957), at 3, 
cited in Kucherov, ‘Legal Problems of  Outer Space: USA and Soviet Viewpoints’, 2 PLOS (1959) 64, at 67.
51 One may note, here, the request made by the UN General Assembly in GA Res. 2222 (XXI), 19 December 
1966, that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of  Outer Space (COPUOS) should seek to define outer 
space. It passed the matter on to the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee, which replied in 1967 that 
‘it is not possible at the present time to identify scientific or technical criteria which would permit a pre-
cise and lasting definition of  outer space’. Report of  the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of  Outer Space, 
Agenda Item 32, UN Doc. A/6804, 27 December 1967, Annex II, para. 36.
52 For the early view that cosmic space was a ‘legal vacuum’, see Korovin, ‘International Status of  Cosmic 
Space’, 1 International Affairs (1959) 54; see generally R. Erickson, International Law and the Revolutionary 
State (1972), at 117–120.
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enjoy some other status? How, furthermore, could the demilitarization of  outer space 
be ensured?
The common features of  the ‘code’ for outer space as it developed over the ensuing 
years (reading cumulatively GA Resolutions 1962 (XVIII) and 1994 (XVIII) of  1963, 
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1979 Moon Treaty) were fivefold. First, the ex-
ploration and use of  outer space should be carried on for the benefit and in the inter-
ests of  ‘all mankind’ (astronauts, hence, should be treated as ‘envoys of  mankind’). 
Second, outer space should be free for exploration and use by all states on the basis of  
equality, and there should be freedom of  scientific investigation. Third, outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, should not be open to ‘national appro-
priation by claim of  sovereignty’.53 The moon and its natural resources, according to 
the Moon Treaty, were to be treated as the ‘common heritage of  mankind’. Fourth, 
the moon and celestial bodies should be used ‘exclusively for peaceful purposes’ and 
the placing in orbit/stationing of  objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons 
of  mass destruction should be prohibited.54 Finally, their exploration and use should 
be carried on ‘in accordance with international law, including the Charter of  the 
United Nations, in the interest of  maintaining international peace and security and 
promoting international co-operation and understanding’.55 Beyond this, the code re-
affirms the principle of  state responsibility (including responsibility for the activities 
of  nationals and organizations of  which the state was a member) and that of  con-
tinuing jurisdiction and control over objects launched into space. All of  the texts that 
constituted the code emphasize repeatedly the necessity of  promoting ‘international 
co-operation’.
Quite apart from the obvious qualifications that have to be made about the status 
of  the meagrely ratified Moon Treaty, two initial aspects of  the code are worth em-
phasizing. In the first place, it is easy to overlook the undoubtedly radical character of  
this extraversion of  international law into outer space56 – international law was, on 
this view, suddenly declared to be of  unlimited extent, inter-galactic as much as inter-
national, an omnipresent order disarticulated from the site of  its geographical origin. 
In the second place, it was more than evident that the code, thus described, was replete 
with equivocations and silences. It said nothing about the jurisdictional delimitation 
of  outer space, about remote sensing and direct television broadcasting, or about the 
allocation of  rights over the geostationary orbit.57 Still less did it resolve the question 
53 See, e.g., P. Jessup and H. Taubenfeld, Controls for Outer Space (1959), at 210; C. Chaumont, Le Droit de 
L’Espace (1960), at 114; International Law Association (ILA), Resolution on Air Sovereignty and the 
Legal Status of  Outer Space, Report of  49th Conference of  ILA (1960), at 267.
54 Moon Treaty, supra note 42, Art. 3(4) also prohibits the establishment of  military bases on the moon.
55 See, e.g., GA Res. 1721A (XVI), 20 December 1961.
56 See Beebe, ‘Laws Empire and the Final Frontier: Legalizing the Future in the Early Corpus Juris Spatialis’, 
108 Yale Law Journal (1998–1999) 1737. Ranganathan draws attention to the way in which the exten-
sion of  international jurisdiction to the seabed was configured around it being socially or economically 
‘disembedded’. Ranganathan, ‘Ocean Floor Grab: International Law and the Making of  an Extractive 
Imaginary’, in this issue, 573.
57 On this see Collis, ‘The Geostationary Orbit: A Critical legal Geography of  Space’s Most Valuable Real 
Estate’, in D. Bell and M. Parker, Space Travel and Culture: From Apollo to Space Tourism (2009) 47.
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as to whether claims to property might be made in relation to resources removed from 
celestial objects or whether military use of  the ‘extra-celestial void’ was legitimate. 
And, to the extent that these might be attributed to a straightforward failure on the 
part of  the drafters to pay attention to such issues, or perhaps more obviously to an 
evident lack of  ‘political will’, the code may be read as largely transparent – as a literal 
or manifest representation of  the limits of  legal regulation in the conflictual circum-
stances of  its production.
Yet, as Louis Althusser points out, such a strategy of  ‘innocent’ reading will only 
take us so far.58 It will tell us only what was already palpable to the authors of  the 
code. What it will not do is tell us much about the conditions under which the code 
appeared, why it assumed the form it did or what pre-suppositions had to be held 
in place for it to make sense to its authors. For that, a strategy of  ‘symptomatic 
reading’ would seem to be necessary.59 Such a strategy, as Althusser explains, in-
volves not simply looking at a text for the purposes of  determining what it seeks to 
make clear or manifest but, rather, attending also to its constitutive silences – by 
which he means, not simply what was not said but also what could not be said. The 
latter strategy, as he points out, involves identifying within a text the ‘problematic’ 
with which it is engaged  – a framework or enquiry or mode of  thought that en-
abled certain things to be ‘thinkable’, ‘visible’ or ‘legible’, and others, by contrast, 
‘unthinkable’, ‘invisible’ or ‘illegible’. Symptomatic reading, in these terms, is set to 
reveal what must be silently repressed, or kept out of  sight in order for that which is 
visible to have meaning.
In order to approach the code for space with this strategy of  reading in mind, we 
might want to begin with the observation that the code is structured around a set of  
oppositions: that outer space is a domain of  peace, not of  war; a domain of  collabora-
tive endeavour, not of  competition; a domain of  the future, not the past and, finally, 
a domain entirely beyond the order of  sovereignty and the atmospheric conditions 
that enable it – a commons. Each of  these oppositions, however, gives expression to 
an incipient relationship between the objective in question and its conditions of  pos-
sibility: between the prohibition of  violence and the violence necessary for keeping 
the peace; between utopian ideas and the dystopian imaginaries that engender them; 
and between the idea of  a commons and the regimes of  sovereignty and property from 
which it derives its content. Taking this formation as my starting point, I want to de-
velop in the ensuing sections of  this article the argument that the code for outer space 
was built upon two forms of  illegibility, both of  which may be associated with ‘Cold 
War’ thought. One of  these concerns a suppression of  the idea of  outer space as a site 
of  warfare; the other a suppression of  the idea that space might be a site of  primitive 
accumulation.
58 Althusser’s formulation, in fact, is more forceful: ‘[T]here is no such thing as an innocent reading’ (‘il n’est 
toutefois pas de lecture innocente’). L. Althusser and E. Balibar, Reading Capital (1970), at 14.
59 Ibid., at 14–29.
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4 War and Peace in Space
There was little doubt to any of  the observers of  the launch of  Sputniks I and II in 
1957 that, despite their overtly ‘scientific’ purposes, the arms race had taken a decisive 
new turn. The exploration of  outer space clearly offered a range of  potential benefits; 
alongside the possibility of  research into the physics of  the atmosphere, it also would 
facilitate the collection of  a host of  meteorological, geophysical and cartographic 
data, enable enhanced capacity for radio communication and television broadcasting, 
facilitate safe navigation and, finally, open up the possibility of  experimental flights 
to the moon and beyond. No one, however, was blind to the military implications.60 
Within the USA, in particular, there was a widespread belief  that command over outer 
space was an imperative that could not be missed: ‘[W]hoever controls outer space’, it 
was often said, ‘controls the world’.61 In the wilder speculations, thus, it was imagined 
that a nuclear power might be in a position to launch guided missiles from a space 
platform to any point on earth with barely any possibility of  response, that outer space 
would be filled with ‘orbiting bombers’ or that the moon would become the site of  mili-
tary rocket installations. ‘Control’ of  outer space, thus, was immediately conceived as 
being vital as a matter of  security.
Such concerns seemed to place a premium upon ensuring that the ‘use’ of  outer 
space was exclusively peaceful – a view that seemed to be affirmed not merely by the 
establishment of  COPUOS and successive proposals put to the UN by both the USA and 
Soviet Union. It was also recognized in the US National Aeronautics and Space Act 
of  1958, which created a civilian space agency (NASA) and declared, in the process, 
that ‘it is the policy of  the United States that activities in space should be devoted to 
peaceful purposes for the benefit of  all mankind’.62 This theme was carried through 
into the code for outer space – UN General Assembly Resolution 1962 recognizing ‘the 
common interest of  all mankind in the progress of  the exploration and use of  outer 
space for peaceful purposes’ and the Outer Space Treaty that added in Article 4 that 
states should not place nuclear weapons or weapons of  mass destruction in orbit and 
that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all states parties ‘exclusively 
for peaceful purposes’ (military bases and fortifications, in particular, being prohibited). 
Indeed, President Lyndon B. Johnson described the Outer Space Treaty as ‘the most im-
portant arms-control development since the limited test-ban treaty of  1963’.63
60 See, e.g., Report of  the President’s Science Advisory Committee (1958); J. Killian, Sputnik, Scientists and 
Eisenhower (1977), Appendix 4, at 289, which makes clear that, of  the four reasons to invest in space, 
technology one was ‘the defense objective’: ‘If  space is to be used for military purposes, we must be pre-
pared to use space to defend ourselves.’
61 Lyndon Johnson was to observe in 1958 that ‘[t]he urgent race we are now in – or which we must enter – 
is not the race to perfect long-range ballistic missiles, important as that is. There is something more im-
portant than any ultimate weapon. That is the ultimate position – the position of  total control over earth 
that lies somewhere out in space.’ Cited in Killian, supra note 60, at 9.
62 National Aeronautics and Space Act, (1958) 42 USC ch. 26, para. 2451, s. 101(a).
63 Cited in Fawcett, supra note 38, at 29.
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In an immediate sense, then, outer space was configured as a space radically distinct 
from atmospheric space and was placed at once beyond the field of  both sovereignty 
and of  war. These, however, were by no means co-terminous. The preferred analogy 
when discussing the status of  outer space was often that of  the high seas – like the 
seas, outer space should be marked by the principle of  freedom of  access and move-
ment, a res communis incapable of  being ‘enclosed’. In fact, this was the analogy used 
by the USA when defending its use of  satellites for reconnaissance purposes; ‘recon-
naissance’ from space, it was argued, was the functional equivalent of  surveillance 
from the high seas.64 It is clear, however, that this analogy was problematic precisely 
because the high seas themselves were not immune from being brought within the 
field of  military conflict.65 And, with that in mind, alternative modes of  analysis were 
often proffered to ensure that the ‘commons’ was not to be equated with a potential 
field of  battle.66
Nevertheless, there was always a certain equivocation running through discussions 
within the UN and elsewhere as to whether the military/non-military distinction was 
one that could be effectively held in place. Not only were the Declaration on Outer 
Space and Outer Space Treaty silent on certain vital matters – on the equipping of  
satellites, for example, with conventional weaponry or the militarization of  the ‘extra-
celestial void’ – but the inclusion of  Article 3, which instructed states to ‘carry on 
activities’ in accordance with international law and the UN Charter ‘in the interest of  
maintaining international peace and security’, gave expression to the idea, vaunted 
at various moments, that outer space may nevertheless be the site of  military action 
in self-defence.67 ‘Peaceful’ use, on such a measure, was not to be calibrated by refer-
ence to the equipment or personnel put into space – whether military or civilian – but, 
 rather, by reference to the ends or motivation of  the actors in question.68 In the case of  
the USA, this was to resolve itself  in the idea that ‘peaceful use’ should not be equated 
with ‘non-military use’ but, instead, with ‘non-aggressive’ use. As Senator Albert 
Gore was to put it, when speaking before the UN First Committee in 1962:
[i]t is the view of  the United States that outer space should be used only for peaceful – that is, 
non-aggressive and beneficial – purposes. The question of  military activities in space cannot 
be divorced from the question of  military activities on earth. To banish these activities in 
64 See McMahon, ‘Legal Aspects of  Outer Space’, 38 British Yearbook of  International Law (1962) 339, at 
371–372.
65 For Soviet objections on this score, see Crane, ‘Soviet Attitude toward International Space Law’, 59 
American Journal of  International Law (AJIL) (1962) 685, at 694–695.
66 See, e.g., the differentiation between ‘neutralized’ and ‘demilitarized’ space. Kopal, ‘The Problem of  
Neutralization and Demilitarization of  Outer Space’, 4 PLOS (1961) 336.
67 See, e.g., L. Lipson and N. Katzenbach, Report to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(1961), at 25–26; Cooper, ‘Self-Defense in Outer Space’, 11 German Journal of  Air and Space Law 
(1962) 186.
68 Crane notes that Soviet military doctrine had by 1962 dropped its objections to the militarization of  
space and embraced a standpoint equivalent to that of  the USA – namely, that it might be used for de-
fensive purposes. R. Crane, ‘The Beginnings of  Marxist Space Jurisprudence’, 57 AJIL (1963) 614; see 
also E.  Jaksetic, ‘The Peaceful Uses of  Outer Space: Soviet Views’, 28 American University Law Review 
(1978–1979) 483.
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both environments we must continue our efforts for general and complete disarmament with 
 adequate safeguards. Until this is achieved, the test of  any space activities must not be whether 
it is military or non-military, but whether or not it is consistent with the United Nations Charter 
and other obligations of  law.69
The same general tenor was maintained in the discussion over Article 4 of  the Outer 
Space Treaty concerning the demilitarization of  the moon and celestial bodies. In this 
treaty, it was admitted that the use of  military personnel ‘for scientific research or other 
peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited’, largely in recognition of  the fact that for both 
space powers it was the military, not civilian agencies, who were responsible for develop-
ing rocket and other outer space capabilities. What one might see in this is a straight-
forward determination, on the part of  both space powers, to continue the practice of  
exploiting outer space for purposes of  defence whilst holding on, at the same time, to 
the general idea that outer space was a space of  peaceful endeavour. Defensive militar-
ization, here, was to be conceptualized as the functional equivalent of  total demilitariza-
tion. Yet ‘defence’ was also an unstable category in circumstances of  a bipolar military 
standoff  that depended upon a balance of  forces. For not only might an effective defence 
depend upon first strike capability (as the doctrine of  ‘mutually assured destruction’ was 
to suggest),70 but also, as was later to become evident following the announcement of  
the US Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983,71 even the construction of  an overtly ‘defen-
sive’ system could assume an offensive cast if  only one party possessed that capacity.72
There was, however, also a much deeper problematic at work here, which related 
to the persistence of  a governmental rationality that was held over from the earlier 
 decades of  the 20th century, that understood the necessity of  bringing all social re-
sources – economic, technical, scientific and human – to bear in defence of  the state 
against an existential threat. This was articulated in the interwar years in the the-
ories of  total war developed by the likes of  Erich Ludendorff73 and Ernst Jünger,74 but 
was carried forward, well into the aftermath of  World War II.75 Even if, at Nuremberg, 
69 UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1289, 3 December 1962, at 13. For a critique, see Gorove, ‘Arms Control Provisions in 
the Outer Space Treaty: A Scrutinizing Reappraisal’, 3 Georgia Journal of  International and Comparative Law 
(1973) 114; Cheng, ‘The Legal Status of  Outer Space and Relevant Issues: Delimitation of  Outer Space 
and Definition of  Peaceful Use’, 11 Journal of  Space Law (1983) 89.
70 The idea of  mutually assured destruction had underpinned the strategic disarmament limitation talk 
(SALT) agreements, including the Treaty on the Limitation of  Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (1972, 944 
UNTS 13), which had sought to avoid conflict through limiting the deployment of  defensive anti-ballistic 
missile systems. The second SALT on 18 June 1979 included a provision prohibiting the development, 
testing and deployment of  systems for placing into Earth’s orbit nuclear weapons or weapons of  mass 
destruction, including fractional orbital missiles. It was never ratified and expired in 1985.
71 See Burton, ‘Daggers in the Air: Anti-Satellite Weapons and International Law’, 12 Fletcher Forum (1988) 
143. The proposed system included space- and ground-based nuclear X-ray lasers, subatomic particle 
beams and computer-guided projectiles fired by electromagnetic rail guns. It was eventually abandoned 
after publication of  a negative report by the American Physical Society in 1987.
72 See Fisher, ‘US Foreign Policy under Regan and Bush’, in M.  Leffler and O.A. Westad, The Cambridge 
History of  the Cold War (2010), vol. 3, 267, at 277–279.
73 E. Ludendorff, Der totale Krieg (1935).
74 E. Junger, ‘Total Mobilization’, in R. Wolin (ed.), The Heidegger Controversy (1991) 119.
75 See, e.g., B. Liddell Hart, The Revolution in Warfare (1947).
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the tribunal had associated the practice of  total war with the pathologies of  National 
Socialism,76 as the likes of  Georg Schwarzenberger and Josef  Kunz were to observe, 
it was a method of  waging war that was only, in small part, to be associated with the 
problem of  totalitarianism. For both, the phenomenon of  total warfare was a much 
more general one – associated with technological developments in arms, indiscrim-
inate modes of  warfare and the mobilization of  the civilian population – and was as 
much in play in the 1950s as it had been in earlier decades.77 If  the prospect of  nuclear 
annihilation meant that no element of  society would be spared, so also, it seemed to 
follow, no element of  society should be excluded from preparations to ward off  that 
eventuality.
Whilst, in the case of  the Soviet Union, the ethos of  centralized planning and a 
party bureaucracy equipped with an ideology of  collective ownership and class war-
fare naturally dissolved any operative distinctions between the civil and the military 
establishment,78 the same was also apparent in the USA where, as was recognized as 
early as 1945, the ongoing development of  new technologies of  offence and defence, 
in conditions of  competition, would require ‘the participation of  every element of  the 
civilian population’ and, in particular, the enlistment of  the countries research capa-
bilities.79 Alongside the development of  what Dwight Eisenhower later described as a 
‘military-industrial complex’, guided by a ‘scientific-technological elite’,80 the ration-
alities of  the Cold War were to envelop US society in a much more profound way – from 
the mobilization of  the media in defence of  free thought, the enlistment of  corpor-
ations, unions and research establishments in defence of  national security and the 
co-option of  cultural institutions (from Hollywood to the universities81) in the affective 
management and policing of  public life.82
The significance of  this in the context of  outer space was the almost total loss of  any 
way to distinguish effectively between military and civilian activities. Just as the re-
quirements of  resourcing a technologically dependent military armature increasingly 
depended upon a civilian infrastructure of  research, industry and economic manage-
ment,83 so also was it clear that prospective civilian and scientific activities in space 
76 International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Judgment, 1 October 1946, reprinted in 41 AJIL (1947) 172, 
at 224.
77 G. Schwarzenberger, ‘The Law of  Air Warfare and the Trend towards Total War’, 1 University of  Malaya 
Law Review (1959) 120, at 136; Kunz, ‘The Chaotic State of  the Law of  War and the Urgent Necessity for 
Their Revision’, 45 AJIL (1951) 37, at 41–42; see also Kelly, ‘A Legal Analysis of  the Changes in War’, 13 
Military Law Review (1961) 89.
78 Eisenhower was famously to observe that ‘what makes the Soviet threat unique in its history is its all-
inclusiveness. Every human activity is pressed into service as a weapon of  expansion. Trade, economic 
development, military power, arts, science, education, the whole world of  ideas – all are harnessed to 
this same chariot of  expansion. The Soviets are, in short, waging total cold war.’ D. Eisenhower, Annual 
Message to the Congress of  the State of  the Union, 9 January 1958.
79 Joint Statement of  Secretaries of  the War and the Navy, 12 February 1945.
80 D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People, 17 January 1961.
81 See generally A. Rubin, Archives of  Authority: Empire, Culture and the Cold War (2012).
82 H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (1964), at 21.
83 S. Meacham, Labor and the Cold War (1959), at 9.
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(such as meteorology, remote sensing, navigation systems and telecommunications) 
all had military dimensions. If, for example, developments in meteorological know-
ledge and environmental science seemed to open up the possibility of  weather control 
for the purposes of  combating drought, improving agriculture or the avoidance of  
natural disasters, so also could that same science assist in the development of  military 
communications and ballistic missile capability (which depended upon information 
about the lower and upper atmosphere, ionospheric behaviour, geodesy and geomag-
netism).84 Such knowledge also opened up new possibilities for manipulating weather 
systems in order to procure military advantage (such as the manipulation of  thunder-
storms to disable communication systems or the creation of  fog or cloud).85
But it was not just about scientific knowledge enabling new avenues of  military 
innovation; it was also about the purposes to which the same technology might be 
put. Thus, for example, the camera-equipped satellite programmes (Tiros, CORONA), 
with the auxiliary systems of  information recovery and reproduction, were virtually 
identical (give or take a few degrees of  resolution) whether they were used for the pur-
poses of  geodetic measurement and weather prediction or military reconnaissance. In 
some cases, furthermore – such as the US Galactic Radiation Background satellite – 
intelligence-gathering electronics was incorporated within the same instrument used 
for the measurement of  solar radiation.86
For the most part, the integrated utility of  scientific and military technology 
came to be expressed through the language of  ‘dual use’; just as nuclear science 
was capable of  use for both pacific and military purposes, so also were satellites, 
rockets and space stations equally capable of  deployment in pursuit of  scientific, as 
well as military, ends.87 Overtly, of  course, the notion of  dual use took as its starting 
point an idea of  ‘pure science’ being concerned with the discovery or production 
of  politically innocent knowledge, which might then be put to ‘use’ or be ‘applied’ 
for either civilian or military purposes. Aside from the fact that the degree of  con-
trol and influence exercised by defence establishments over the direction of  science 
within research institutions put in question any idea of  there being such a thing 
as ‘innocent’ scientific knowledge,88 it was, as Marcuse has observed, a conception 
of  science that was already fully instrumentalized. Its very claim to objectivity was 
84 See Doel, ‘Constituting the Postwar Earth Sciences: The Military’s Influence on the Environmental 
Sciences in the USA after 1945’, 33 Social Studies of  Science (2003) 635.
85 See Taubenfeld and Taubenfeld, ‘Some International Implications of  Weather Modification Activities’, 23 
International Organization (IO) (1969) 808. Concern as to the potentially damaging effects of  the militar-
ization of  environmental science led to the conclusion of  the Convention on the Prohibition of  Military 
or Any Other Hostile Use of  Environmental Modification Techniques 1977, 1108 UNTS 151.
86 See G. van Keuren, ‘Cold War Science in Black and White: US Intelligence Gathering and its Scientific 
Cover at the Naval Research Laboratory 1948–62’, 31 Social Studies of  Science (2001) 207, at 220–222.
87 The control of  ‘dual use’ technology was subject to control by Western powers through the Coordinating 
Committee on Multilateral Export Controls. This was later replaced by the Wassenaar Arrangement on 
Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies on 11–12 July 1996; see 
also EC Reg. 1334/2000 (2000) (as amended).
88 See generally N.  Oreskes and J.  Krige, Science and Technology in the Global Cold War (2014); Reynolds, 
‘Science, Technology and the Cold War’, in Leffler and Westad, supra note 72, vol. 3, 378.
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a sign of  its subordination to technology and to an instrumental logic of  ends. As 
he put it:
True, the rationality of  pure science is value-free and does not stipulate any practical ends, it is 
‘neutral’ to any extraneous values that may be imposed upon it. But this neutrality is a positive 
character. Scientific rationality makes for a specific societal organization precisely because it 
projects mere form … which can be bent to practically all ends.89
Whilst the scientific method allowed nature to be brought under human domination 
through the medium of  an enabling technology, it was, in the same measure, a means 
for the domination ‘of  man by man’ insofar as the human subject would always  appear 
before it as a mere ‘object of  organization’. Both the human and the natural worlds 
would thus become the calculable objects of  a technological rationality that knew no 
limits – ‘in which society and nation, mind and body are kept in a state of  permanent 
mobilization for the defense of  this universe’.90
Marcuse’s critique of  the totalitarian rationalities of  what he saw to be the Cold War 
regimes of  ‘total administration’ found particular expression in the fact that  scientific 
knowledge itself  was understood to be a facet of  ideological competition in its own 
right.91 What was at stake was not just ballistic missiles and warheads but also a capa-
city for scientific or technological innovation that would, itself, demonstrate to the 
world at large the superior social merits of  capitalism or communism, respectively. The 
shock experienced at the launch of  Sputnik I, after all, was not that the Soviet Union 
had suddenly acquired command over outer space or imminently threatened the USA 
with annihilation but, rather, that it demonstrated the superiority of  its  scientific and 
technical expertise. It was apparent to both powers at that moment that such spec-
tacular demonstrations of  scientific achievement92 were an essential part of  a com-
petitive ideology of  rule that required the broad enlistment of  the population to enable 
it to function.93 Science had its part to play, in that sense, in the affective production of  
fear, awe and loyalty, all of  which were necessary for the operations of  the Cold War 
to remain in place.94
If, in that sense, the governing rationalities of  Cold War thought led to a disinte-
gration of  the classical demarcation between war and peace through practices of  
89 Marcuse, supra note 82, at 160.
90 Ibid., at 172.
91 See K.  Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (2006), at 
323–353.
92 David Nye speaks here of  the US space programme as being a vehicle for the ‘American technological sub-
lime’, renewing faith in America and the ‘ultimate beneficience of  advanced industrialisation’. D. Nye, 
American Technological Sublime (1994), at 256.
93 Marcuse, supra note 82, at 54–55, was to observe that ‘the foreign policy of  containment appears as the 
extension of  the domestic policy of  containment. … Free institutions compete with authoritarian ones 
in making the Enemy a deadly force within the system. And this deadly force stimulates growth and ini-
tiative, not by virtue of  the magnitude and economic impact of  the defense “sector”, but by virtue of  the 
fact that the society as a whole becomes a defense society. For the enemy is permanent. He is not in the 
emergency situation by in the normal state of  affairs.’
94 See J. Masco, The Theater of  Operations (2014), at 128–129.
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total mobilization, the fact that it was operationalized through the technologies of  
outer space was nevertheless significant. For what was produced through those tech-
nologies was, above all else, a new planetary optic – a new way of  visualizing and 
 imagining the world – instanced most affectively in the images ‘Earth Rise’ and ‘Whole 
Earth’,95 but operationalized more routinely in the knowledge production systems of  
satellite reconnaissance and remote sensing. The fact that the world came into view 
through the media res of  a militarized system of  surveillance, which knew no limits as 
to what forms of  knowledge might offer military advantage, opened up the spectre of  
an unlimited battlefield, no longer encased within any prescriptive spatial limits, but 
a battlefield planetary in scale. The imperative of  peace that was to mark the code, 
then, was as urgent as it appeared impossible – there being no longer any available 
way of  speaking of  peace other than in the language of  warfare, no conceivable oper-
ations or forms of  knowledge that could not be at service to that end, no space which 
it might not occupy. Even if  the annihilatory conditions of  East–West confrontation 
might have passed, the formation that enabled it has certainly not, and its traces are 
to be found in the imaginative and technological conditions of  the ‘everywhere war’ 
of  the contemporary era.96
5 Constructing the Outer Space Commons
A key feature of  Schachter’s account of  the anticipated law of  outer space, as we 
have seen, was that it should be recognized as being part of  the ‘common heritage 
of  humanity’ and placed beyond the order of  sovereignty, open to free and equal use. 
However, this was not to preclude, in his view, the free use and exploitation of  the re-
sources of  outer space, and, for him, the analogy with the resources of  the sea was 
dominant. Whilst it was by no means obvious how a state might go about extracting 
resources from other planets given the payload limits of  rocket technology, he was 
nevertheless channelling a prevalent theme that had been a mark of  science fiction 
literature for some time: asteroid mining, terraforming planets and the exploitation of  
the various rich resources of  outer space.97
Whilst the early satellite experiments in the aftermath of  Sputnik I  made clear 
that both peaceful exploration of  outer space, and satellite overflight, were to be re-
garded as permissible activities, it was not until the end of  that same decade, however, 
that scholars and legal advisors alike began to take seriously the task of  assigning 
a particular character to outer space and address themselves to the question of  its 
95 See Henry and Taylor, ‘Re-thinking Apollo: Envisioning Environmentalism in Space’, in Bell and Parker, 
supra note 57, 190.
96 Gregory, ‘The Everywhere of  War’, 177 Geographical Journal (2011) 238 (in which he notes three prevail-
ing geographies of  war: in which war has become the matrix within which social life is constituted; in 
which the battlefield has given way to an all-enveloping ‘battlespace’ and in which military operations 
now take place in the global borderlands); see also Mégret, ‘War and the Vanishing Battlefield’, 9 Loyola 
University Chicago International Law Review (2011–2012) 131.
97 See, e.g., G. Serviss, Edison’s Conquest of  Mars (1898); R. Heinlein, The Rolling Stones (1952).
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ejil/article-abstract/30/2/547/5536739 by School of O
riental and African Studies user on 07 August 2019
564 EJIL 30 (2019), 547–572
potentially divisible structure. On the one hand, even if  it was clear that, in general, 
outer space should remain free of  claims to sovereignty, it was not quite clear what 
would take its place. Roman law terminology abounded – was it res nullius, res com-
munis omnium,98 res extra commercium,99 res communis humanitatis?100 Or was it a legal 
void, awaiting the development of  ‘legislative facts’ as the US legal advisor put it in 
1959?101 Into the mix were regularly thrown two analogous legal regimes – that of  
the high seas and of  Antarctica (the treaty for which had just been signed in December 
1959).102
On the other hand, it was not entirely clear, even in the context in which outer space 
was in general to be free of  claims of  sovereignty, whether that would also apply in 
equal measure to the planets, asteroids or other objects analogous to land. For if  the 
principles of  general international law were to apply to outer space, it would seem to 
follow that, just as territory was capable of  being brought under national sovereignty 
through effective occupation and foreign recognition, so might also such portions of  
terrae firma in outer space.103 However, the fact that this might encourage a practice of  
symbolic occupation – through the medium of  the planting of  flags on extraterrestrial 
objects – was quickly dismissed. Thus, following Lunik II’s ‘collision’ with the moon in 
1959, the US State Department insisted that ‘[t]he placing of  national insignia would 
not of  course constitute a sufficient basis to found a claim to sovereignty over un-
occupied land masses’.104 What was left open was whether some other kind of  more 
‘effective’ occupation – through perhaps, the imagined construction of  space installa-
tions on the moon – might yet become ‘sufficient’ for such purposes.
In its Declaration on Outer Space, the UN General Assembly had affirmed that outer 
space was to be ‘free for exploration and use’ by all states ‘on a basis of  equality’, and 
that the celestial bodies were not to be ‘subject to national appropriation by claim of  
sovereignty, by means or use of  occupation, or by any other means’.105 This was given 
a further gloss in the Outer Space Treaty, which declared that outer space ‘includ-
ing the moon and other celestial bodies’ to be ‘the province of  all mankind’ (Article 
98 Contra Cheng, ‘The Extra-Terrestrial Application of  International Law’, 18(1) Current Legal Problems 
(1965) 144 (arguing that international law does not recognize the existence of  the concept of  res 
communis).
99 See, e.g., Jenks, ‘International Law and Activities in Space’, 5 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
(1956) 99, at 104.
100 Cocca, ‘The Common Heritage of  Mankind: Doctrine and Principle of  Space Law’, 29 PLOS (1986) 17 
(who distinguishes this from a res communis omnium).
101 Becker, ‘United States Foreign Policy and the Development of  Law for Outer Space’, JAG Journal (1959) 4, 
at 6; see also McDougal and Lipson, ‘Perspectives for a Law of  Outer Space’, 52 AJIL (1958) 407, at 420.
102 The defunct Protocol for Spitzbergen of  1912 was also regarded as a relevant source. See Jessup and 
Taubenfeld, ‘Outer Space, Antarctica and the United Nations’, 13 IO (1959) 363, at 372–373.
103 Jenks, supra note 99, at 111; Cheng, supra note 98, at 148.
104 ‘Pleas Are Expected to Mount for UN Control of  Outer Space’, New York Times (15 September 1959), at 
20. Krushchev famously dismissed any concerns on this front and suggested that the question itself  was 
simply a product of  the ‘capitalist psychology’. ‘Khruschchev Speech at National Press Club’, New York 
Times (17 September 1959).
105 GA Res. 1962 (XVIII), 13 December 1963; see also Institut de Droit International Resolution, 11 
September 1963.
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1(1)) and reiterated that they should be ‘free for exploration and use by all States’ 
(Article 1(2)), and that they should not be subject to ‘national appropriation by claim 
of   sovereignty, by means of  use or occupation, or by any other means’ (Article 2). This 
appeared, as many noted, to not only rule out the possibility of  claiming the moon or 
other bodies as falling within the sovereignty of  the state, but also, by logical exten-
sion, the establishment of  any claims to property over, or within, such spaces.106
In adopting the text of  the Outer Space Treaty in UN General Assembly Resolution 
2222 (1966), however, the General Assembly simultaneously pointed to its limits, 
 recommending in the process that COPUOS study further the question of  the ‘util-
ization of  outer space and celestial bodies’ particularly as regards ‘space communi-
cations’.107 For what was immediately apparent, as the French delegate to COPUOS 
pointed out in the following year,108 was that the principle of  freedom of  use only 
barely engaged the range of  issues that were already starting to appear on the horizon 
– from direct television broadcasting and remote sensing through to environmental 
modification and the occupation of  space in the geostationary orbit. Still less did it 
absolutely resolve the potential future exploitation of  space resources. With respect 
to the latter, furthermore, he observed that ‘the equality in the utilization of  celestial 
bodies which is proclaimed by the Treaty would remain a dead letter if  the exploitation 
of  that wealth were not regulated even before the first users undertook it’.109
With these considerations in mind, Argentina, France and Poland submitted a pro-
posal in the following year,110 leading the legal sub-committee of  COPUOS to embark 
upon a ten-year project to draft what was to become the, largely abortive, Moon Treaty 
of  1979. Whilst much of  the text of  the Moon Treaty tracked the parallel provisions 
in the Outer Space Treaty, the main area of  contention concerned the question of  re-
source exploitation. As early as 1967, the Argentinian representative, Aldo Armando 
Cocca, had argued that the wealth and natural resources of  the moon and other celes-
tial bodies could be used ‘solely for the benefit of  mankind as a whole’,111 and had sub-
sequently submitted a draft agreement to COPUOS proclaiming such resources to be 
the ‘common heritage of  all mankind’.112 What this was generally understood to mean 
was not that outer space resources should be free from ownership or exploitation (as 
106 See, e.g., Quadri, ‘Droit International Cosmique’, 98 Hague Recueil (1959) 505, at 596–597: ‘Dans 
la mesure où un Etat ne peut contrôler la disposition des ressources cosmiques, ces ressources ne sont pas 
juridiquement des choses: elles échappent au domaine du droit qui n’est pas infini’; Cepelka and Gilmour, ‘The 
Application of  General International Law in Outer Space’, 36 Journal of  Air Law and Commerce (1970) 
30, at 38.
107 GA Res. 222 (XXI), 19 December 1966.
108 Seydoux (France), UN Doc. A/AC.105/PV.47, 17 April 1967, at 26–28.
109 Ibid., at 28.
110 Argentina, France and Poland: Proposal, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.69 (1969), Annex I, at 7.
111 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of  Outer Space Legal Sub-Committee, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/
SR.82 (1967), at 5. For Pardo’s similar arguments in relation to the deep seabed in the same year, see 
Ranganathan, supra note 56.
112 Draft Agreement on the Principles Governing Activities in the Use of  Natural Resources of  the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.71 and Corr. 1 (1970).
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an early Soviet draft proposed113) but, rather, that, as and when they were exploited, it 
should be for the benefit of  the entirety of  humanity.114 From that point on, the debate 
stabilized around two alternative schemes: whether, on the one hand, states should 
be entitled to exploit the resources individually subject only to an obligation to dis-
tribute the benefits ‘to all’ or whether, in the alternative, the exploitation of  resources 
was only to take place through the medium of  an international regime/agency and, 
pending its establishment, be subject to a moratorium.115
The final agreement offered support for both positions.116 On the one hand, it de-
clared the moon and its natural resources to be the common heritage of  mankind 
and that the resources ‘in place’ should not become the property of  any state, inter-
national organization, non-governmental entity or natural person. It also committed 
parties to ‘undertake to establish an international regime’ to govern exploitation 
as soon as it became feasible.117 On the other hand, by limiting the prohibition on 
 ownership of  surface and subsurface resources to those ‘in place’, it offered the possi-
bility that they might nevertheless be claimed once removed. The absence of  a vaunted 
‘moratorium’ on extraction, furthermore, was to suggest that exploitation might pro-
ceed subject only to the principle of  ‘equitable sharing’ until the moment at which the 
international regime came to be established.118 In the end, however, the Moon Treaty 
remained largely unratified as many of  its vocal opponents in the USA objected to the 
way in which it appeared to inaugurate a ‘system of  international socialism’,119 fore-
closing ‘the commercial uses of  outer space by American enterprise’.120
What is worth bringing out here is not the surface-level disagreement as to the re-
lationship between collective and individual modes of  extraction or, indeed, the way 
in which an ‘east–west adversarialism’ appeared to have given way to a dynamic 
113 The Soviet Union had momentarily championed this idea. See Soviet Union Draft Treaty, UN Doc. 
A/C.1/L.568 (1971), Art. VIII, in which it was stipulated that such resources should not be the object 
of  ‘concession, exchange, transfer, sale or purchase, lease, hire, gift or any other arrangements with or 
without compensation’. A Bulgarian draft had similarly proposed this as one of  two alternative texts. 
Draft Treaty Relating to the Moon, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.93 (1974).
114 See US proposal, Article VIII – Natural Resources, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2(XI)/WP.12/Rev.1 (1972).
115 For similar debates in the context of  the deep seabed, see Mickelson, ‘Common Heritage of  Mankind as a 
Limit to Exploitation of  the Global Commons’, in this issue, 635.
116 For contrasting interpretations, see discussion of  the Moon Treaty within the ILA in its Report on ‘Space 
Law’, 60 International Law Association Reports (1982) 479.
117 Moon Treaty, supra note 42, Art. 11, paras 1, 3, 5.
118 The interpretation placed upon this by the US delegate was that ‘equitable’ sharing should also include 
consideration being given to the ‘contribution’ made by those states or companies that have contributed 
directly or indirectly to the exploration of  the moon. Hosenball (USA), Committee on the Peaceful Uses of  
Outer Space, UN Doc. A/AC.105/PV. 203 (1979), at 25.
119 As at January 2018, the treaty has been ratified by 18 and signed by four. Status of  International 
Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2018/CRP.3 (2018). Neither 
of  the two major space powers has ratified and, of  the governments possessing launch capabilities, only 
France and India have signed.
120 See Goedhuis, ‘Some Recent Trends in the Interpretation and the Implementation of  the Rules of  
International Space Law’, 19 Columbia Journal of  Transnational Law (1981) 213, at 231–232; see further 
Report of  the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 96th Cong, 2d Sess (1980) 
381, at 465–468.
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of  ‘north–south resource disparity’ but, rather, to the conditions under which the 
formation of  the outer space commons was to appear.121 In the first place, as the 
Nigerian representative in COPUOS noted, the language of  the ‘common heritage 
of  mankind’ had facilitated a subtle shift from a language of  exploration to that 
of  exploitation.122 Outer space was no longer simply a site of  speculative scientific 
endeavour or open to projects of  exploration and discovery, but it had become a 
 resource or, indeed, as Myres McDougal and others were to explain, a myriad of  
 resources of  varying kinds, in which everything from solar radiation, magnetic and 
gravitational forces, wave lengths, geostationary locations123 through to  meteors 
tracking through the solar system came to be conceptualized in terms of  their 
 ultimate ‘value’ or ‘utility’.124
Once again, thus, one sees the presence of  a particular technological rationality 
undergirding the outer space regime, in which the natural and human environments 
were to be understood to be the objects of  an instrumental reasoning that concerned 
itself  with how they might be manipulated, controlled, exploited and, ultimately, com-
modified, and in which the technology through which those ends were to be both con-
ceived and achieved (space rockets, probes, telescopes, satellites, planetary rovers and 
so on) would take the form of  a passive, neutral, medium  –  as mere machines and 
mechanisms or as ways of  doing things.125 The embrace of  this rationality may, on 
the face of  it, be seen to have been utterly perverse: the ultimate outcome of  a desire to 
avoid a competitive stripping of  the resources of  the moon and other celestial bodies, 
resolving itself  in the creation of  a regime in which that objective, and that way of  
thinking about our planetary environment, was not just dominant but also subor-
dinate to everything else. The technology through which those projects were to be 
made thinkable, furthermore, was clearly only ‘neutral’ to the extent that one could 
121 Gabrynowicz, ‘Space Law: Its Cold War Origins and Challenges in the Era of  Globalization’, 37 Suffolk 
University Law Review (2004) 1041, at 1046.
122 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of  Outer Space, Legal Sub-Committee, Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 249 
(1976) at 3. It is clear, however, that the question of  the exploitation of  resources had been in the back-
ground for some time. See GA Res. 1348 (XIII), 13 December 1958, in which the UN General Assembly 
expressed its desire ‘to promote energetically the fullest exploration and exploitation of  outer space for the 
benefit of  mankind’. For a fuller account of  the ‘exploitation bias’ located within the principle of  Common 
Heritage, see Feichtner, ‘Sharing the Riches of  the Sea: The Redistributive and Fiscal Dimension of  Deep 
Seabed Exploitation’, in this issue, 601.
123 Cf. Declaration of  Bogota, ITU Doc. 81-E, 3 December 1976, Annex 4, at 16, which provided that devices 
placed in geosynchronous orbit above a state ‘require previous and expressed authorization on the part 
of  the concerned state, and the operation of  the device should conform with the national law of  that 
 territorial country over which it is placed’.
124 For an elaboration of  space activities in the language of  ‘resources’, see M.  McDougall et  al., ‘The 
Enjoyment and Acquisition of  Resources in Outer Space’, 111 University of  Pennsylvania Law Review 
(1963) 521.
125 It is to be noted that the Moon Treaty, supra note 42, conceptualizes the environment of  the moon and 
that of  the earth as distinct. According to Art. 7(1), states should seek to prevent the disruption of  the 
moon environment through the introduction of  ‘extra-environmental matter’, and the same should be 
the case in respect of  the earth.
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separate its existence from the fact of  its (largely exclusive) possession and control by 
two violent, competitive, superpowers.126
As Marcuse observed, however, that same rationality – common to both Western 
and Soviet state forms127 – cut deeper than this. On the one hand, the technologies of  
mass communication, surveillance and warfare were to profoundly shape the percep-
tion, experience and apprehension of  everyday life, creating a ‘technological reality’ 
of  an ‘object world’ conceived ‘as a world of  instrumentalities’.128 On the other hand, 
however, that same rationality would serve to alienate the subject from their life world 
through their incorporation into the ‘technological community of  the administered 
population’.129 The domination of  nature that technology appeared to enable was 
thus only one side of  a formation that had, as its complement, a human domination 
propagated through the technological ‘administration’ of  the subject and the manu-
facture of  human desires, needs and interests.130 To the extent, then, that the Moon 
Treaty embraced this rationality, it was one that was ultimately pacifying in effect, 
swallowing up and repulsing all alternatives, bringing all within the sway of  the same 
totalitarian tendency.
In the second place, and as an apparently countervailing measure, was the idea 
that access to, and the use of, outer space resources should be subject to an inter-
national regime, the ‘purposes’ of  which were set out in Article 11(7). Just as the 
International Telecommunication Union managed the ‘technical’ distribution of  
wavelengths and frequencies, allocating slots in the geostationary orbit, and just as 
the World Meteorological Organization coordinated the collection and dissemination 
of  meteorological data, so also it was envisaged that the resources of  the moon should 
similarly be subject to the oversight of  an international regime of  rational administra-
tion. The anticipated regime, it was explained, would concern itself  with the ‘orderly 
and safe development of  the natural resources’, their ‘rational management’, ‘the ex-
pansion of  opportunities in the use of  those resources’ and an ‘equitable sharing of  
the benefits’. The model of  administration imagined here was one clearly designed to 
displace the possibility of  unrestricted pillage or of  primitive accumulation, and the 
language deployed elicited a sense of  distance from precisely those ideas. No mention 
is made of  the practices of  extraction, commodification or exploitation that might be 
enabled; rather, it is faintly suggested, the moon might be ‘improved’ through its ‘de-
velopment’, terraformed perhaps into a site fit for tourism or colonization?
Yet, by the same token, the arrangements seemed to be concerned merely with the 
transfiguration of  relations of  power into bureaucratic technique and, in doing so, 
maintained in place the very same conditions that underpinned the practices to which 
126 Cf. T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, Dialectic of  the Enlightenment (1972), at 121: ‘[N]o mention is made 
of  the fact that the basis on which technology acquires power over society is the power of  those whose 
economic hold over society is greatest. A technological rationale is the rationale of  domination itself. It is 
the coercive nature of  society alienated from itself.’
127 See H. Marcuse Soviet Marxism (1957), at 196.
128 Marcuse, supra note 82, at 223 (emphasis in original).
129 Ibid., at 28.
130 Ibid., at xlvi.
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it was opposed. Certainly, it was clearly envisaged that a further agreement would 
follow, setting out in more detail the administrative arrangements required for the 
purposes of  the ‘equitable sharing of  benefits’. Certainly, it was also possible that such 
arrangements might include the transfer of  technology, the sharing of  science and the 
distribution of  profits. But no measure of  administration could avoid the observation 
that the regime was to authorize in space precisely the same operations that had been 
productive of  the material inequalities on earth, albeit this time it was ‘colonization’ 
or ‘conquest’ in the name of  humanity (‘mankind’) rather than some small subset of  
the same.
Finally, and related to this, the very ‘commonness’ of  humanity to which the regime 
gave expression was ultimately a vestigial one. Humanity was to be represented here, 
not as a universal community of  free-willing subjects or as a set of  values – of  rights 
or needs – but, rather, through the mediate category of  material ‘interests’; the explor-
ation and use of  the moon, as Article 4 puts it, ‘shall be carried out for the benefit and 
in the interests of  all countries’. What humanity had in common, thus, and what de-
fined it once one took away the categories of  rule and ownership, was a fluid, economy 
of  ‘interests’,131 the fulfilment of  which was always more or less and which was open 
to be bargained, traded, sacrificed and exchanged.
These ‘interests’ assumed the same metaphorical function of  assets and liabilities in 
double-entry bookkeeping – as abstract quantities capable of  being compiled, indexed, 
managed, balanced and administered in the same way as the material resources to 
which they appeared to relate. Whilst undoubtedly central to the foundations of  both 
capitalism132 and liberal democratic thought,133 they bespoke, in the same measure, 
of  a natural social mechanism or instinct that transcended time and place, that 
was universally operable and ascribable equally to ‘future generations’ as much as 
to those of  the present. They were/are, in that sense, always ‘common’ and every-
where present, even if  the plea to ‘commonness’ would frequently arrive in the form 
of  a demand for their moderation. Their function, however, has been to rationalize 
social relations, describe their operative mechanics and authorize sovereignty, all in a 
manner akin to the market – in which human life, qua interests, is the formal subject 
matter of  processes of  transaction and exchange. If  then the ultimate telos of  the re-
gime was to turn, by some bewitching magic, something that was not capable of  being 
owned into something that might become so (through its removal), so also it seemed 
to imagine that this was also the case with respect to the category of  ‘humanity’ that it 
ushered into existence. Humanity comes to be expressed, ultimately, in a metaphoric-
ally commodified form of  life identified in and through its relationship to the resources 
over which it seeks to have control. To be human is to partake of  the ‘interests’ in the 
resources of  the moon and other planetary bodies in which all are deemed to share.
131 For the significance of  ‘interests’ in political realism, see, e.g., H. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace (5th edn, 1978), at 5: ‘The main signpost that helps political realism to find its 
way through the landscape of  international politics is the concept of  interest defined in terms of  power.’
132 A. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (1977).
133 For a critique, see M. Horkheimer, The Eclipse of  Reason (1946), at 26.
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Just as outer space was a site in which the distinction between peace and war be-
came blurred so as to make warfare itself  an illegible part of  the regime, so also we 
might observe, in this context, another similar construction. Here, the regime takes on 
the character of  that which it seeks to prevent or avoid – a system of  resource extrac-
tion and of  primitive accumulation, through which every other relationship human-
kind might have with the outer space environment, and, indeed, with itself, comes to 
be mediated. As the instrumental object of  a regime of  management that has the ‘use’ 
of  nature as its operative configuration, outer space becomes enmeshed within the 
one-dimensional dynamics of  the total administrative state that was central to its for-
mation and, with it, the very meaning of  what it is to be human in space.
6 Conclusion
In a brief  article entitled ‘Des Espaces Autres’ written in 1967, Michel Foucault sug-
gested that, whilst the ‘great obsession’ of  the 19th century was history – its mytho-
logical resource being the second law of  thermodynamics – the middle of  the 20th 
century was better characterized as the ‘epoch of  space’; ‘we are’, he suggests, ‘in the 
epoch of  juxtaposition, the epoch of  the near and far, of  the side-by-side, of  the dis-
persed’.134 In the course of  that essay, however, he was to draw attention to a par-
ticular type of  space (or ‘site’/‘emplacement’) that had emerged in the modern era 
– namely, one that has ‘the curious property of  being in relation with all other sites, 
but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of  relations that they 
happen to designate, mirror or reflect’.135 Such ‘heterotopias’, as he was to call them, 
‘are something like counter-sites, a kind of  effectively enacted utopia in which the real 
sites … that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, con-
tested, and inverted’.136
Whilst he was not to refer to it himself, a case may be made for suggesting that the 
regime of  ‘outer space’ as it was to be constructed in the 1960s represented a near per-
fect exemplar of  the heterotopian sites to which Foucault referred, both in the sense 
of  being a site constructed through the enactment of  a utopian imaginary (as the 
placing of  ‘placeless place’) and in the sense of  it operating as a counter-site in which 
social relations come to be ‘represented, contested, and inverted’. It bears a particu-
larly striking resemblance to Foucault’s example of  the mirror:
In the mirror, I see myself  there where I am not, in an unreal, virtual space that opens behind 
the surface; I am over there, there where I am not, a sort of  shadow that gives my own visi-
bility to myself, that enables me to see myself  there where I am absent: such is the utopia of  the 
mirror. But it is also a heterotopia in so far as the mirror does exist in reality, where it exerts a 
sort of  counteraction on the position that I occupy. From the standpoint of  the mirror I discover 
my absence from the place where I am since I see myself  over there. Starting from this gaze that 
134 Foucault, ‘Of  Other Spaces, Heterotopias’, 5 Architecture, Mouvement, Continuité (1984) 46, para. 1, 
https://foucault.info/doc/documents/heterotopia/foucault-heterotopia-en-html.
135 Ibid., para. 10.
136 Ibid., para. 11.
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is, as it were directed toward me, from the ground of  this virtual space that is on the other side 
of  the glass, I come back toward myself; I begin again to direct my eyes toward myself  and to 
reconstitute myself  there which I am.137
This image of  the mirror evokes the complex functions of  the outer space code, 
bringing into being, through its conceptual and institutional architecture, a space 
that is at once imaginary (futural, anticipatory, mythopoetic138) and real (operated 
through the mediated technology of  satellites and space stations). It is constituted, 
furthermore, in the outward projection of  a set of  rationalities that found their origins 
in Cold War thought (the totalization of  war and the instrumentalization of  nature), 
a site in which the protagonists of  the Cold War could image/imagine the globe and 
situate themselves at its centre, seeing themselves in, and through, where they were 
not. The commons of  outer space was thus, in a first sense, expressive simply of  a Cold 
War ‘commonness’, reflecting what held the protagonists together and what patholo-
gies they shared rather than what divided them. But, in the sense that outer space 
was a site in which a shared vision or common agenda might come to be expressed 
(evidenced in the occasional spectacular performance of  détente), it was also invested 
with the same very common coldness that set them apart.
Even in the aftermath of  the pronounced ‘closure’ of  the Cold War, the residue of  
the formation that was brought into play in space remains very much with us today. 
On the one hand, outer space has been progressively enveloped within the techno-
logical infrastructure of  warfare and policing actions – the first Gulf  War of  1990 
ushering in a new era of  ‘smart’ weaponry and GPS-configured surgical violence139 – 
anticipating, in the process, the ‘remote’ operations of  the drone and cyber warfare 
of  the contemporary era. The blurring of  the demarcation between the (outer space) 
technologies of  war and peace finds its contemporary parallels in the collapse of  a 
range of  other operative distinctions – between the virtual and the real, the combatant 
and the civilian, the battlefield and the battle space, the interstate and the intra-state. 
The juridical formations on which these depend, furthermore, have themselves be-
come enveloped within the same strategic operations – ‘lawfare’ becoming the adjunct 
to a new form of  totalized warfare stripped of  any spatial determinacy.
On the other side, outer space has increasingly become the terrain of  speculative 
capitalism, which, following the growth of  space tourism (pioneered by the Russian 
space administration in the 1990s140), has seen the active development of  a range of  
commercial projects from the construction of  sub-orbital ‘space planes’ to asteroid 
and lunar mining undertaken by both public and private agencies. The imaginative 
resources for such projects have come from various directions, but a common theme 
is that impending resource depletion on earth will soon bring such resources within 
commercial and technological reach, and that outer space will therefore provide 
137 Ibid.
138 Shukaitis, ‘Space Is the (Non)Place: Martians, Marxists, and Outer Space of  the Radical Imagination’, in 
Bell and Parker, supra note 57, 98.
139 See Millard, supra, note 2, at 122–129.
140 See generally Parker, ‘Capitalists in Space’, in Bell and Parker, supra note 57, 83.
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a ‘spatial fix’ for a system of  global capitalism that might otherwise run into the 
ground.141 There is, as Katarina Damjanov has noted,142 a deep parallelism here be-
tween the juridical opening of  the seas (mare liberum), which served to stabilize the 
system of  sovereignty within Europe in the 17th century by extroverting the site of  
conflict and competition,143 and the opening of  outer space three centuries later as an-
other prophylactic measure, even if, in this case, that which was to be guarded against 
was a planetary-wide, environmental catastrophe. Perhaps the deepest irony, here, is 
that the mode of  salvation on offer is precisely the same as that which is the extant 
cause of  crisis, which one may take to be a remorseless instrumentalization of  nature.
141 Dickens, ‘The Cosmos as Capitalism’s Outside’, in Bell and Parker, supra note 57, 66.
142 Damjanov, ‘The Matter of  Media in Outer Space: Technologies of  Cosmobiopolitics’, 33 Environment and 
Planning (2015) 889.
143 See M. Foucault, The Birth of  Biopolitics, translated by G. Burchell (2008), at 55–56.
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